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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
                                          
 
                           No. 01-2275 
                                          
 
 
                        CHARLES M. PAHLER, 
                                        Appellant 
 
                                v. 
 
            CITY OF WILKES-BARRE; THOMAS D. McGROARTY, 
      individually and as Mayor of the City of Wilkes-Barre; 
         WILLIAM J. BARRETT, individually and as Chief of 
               Police in the City of Wilkes-Barre  
                                                   
 
         On Appeal from the United States District Court 
             for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
                   (D.C. Civil No. 00-cv-01143) 
             District Judge:  Hon. William J. Nealon 
                                         
 
            Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                         February 7, 2002 
 
          Before:  SLOVITER, AMBRO, Circuit Judges, and SHADUR, District 
Judge 
                                  
                     (Filed:  March 12, 2002) 
                                          
 
 
                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
      
     Charles Pahler appeals from the District Court's dismissal of his 
complaint 
brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C.  1983 against the City of Wilkes-Barre 
("City"), its 
Mayor, Thomas D. McGroarty ("McGroarty"), and its Chief of Police, William 
Barrett 
("Barrett"), alleging a violation of the substantive due process component 
of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Pahler, a City police officer, was ordered to 
participate in a drug 
raid during which he sustained severe injuries from a buckshot from a 
shotgun of a fellow 
police officer who neglected to set the safety mechanism on the shotgun.  
The officer who 
discharged the shotgun was a member of the Emergency Services Unit ("ESU") 
of the 
Police Department, but the ESU was not used in the raid. 
     Pahler claims that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right 
to due 
process by requiring him to participate in a high risk drug raid with 
officers who were not 
adequately trained and by failing to use the ESU despite the fact that it 
comprises 
"officers who volunteered their candidacy, were then specially selected as 
members of the 
ESU, and were then to be specially and continually trained to manage 
highly dangerous 
incidents of violence arising in the City."  App. at 3.  Pahler was not a 
member of the 
ESU and his duties predominantly consisted of patrolling a specific 
geographical area in a 
marked Department vehicle. 
     Pahler's claim implicates two distinct legal theories: the "state-
created danger" 
theory and the "failure to train" theory.  Pahler now challenges the 
District Court's 
decision, arguing (1) that the District Court committed error by not 
accepting as true the 
factual allegations in the complaint and (2) that the District Court erred 
by concluding 
Pahler failed to plead a cause of action under a "failure to train" 
theory. 
     For the reasons that follow, we will now affirm. 
                                I. 
     In dismissing Pahler's complaint, the District Court held that 
"state-created 
danger" substantive due process claims are "inapplicable to law 
enforcement personnel 
who are injured during the course of their employment."  App. at 61 
(citing Collins v. 
City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992); Rutherford v. City of Newport 
News, 919 
F. Supp. 885 (E.D. Va. 1996), aff'd, 107 F.3d 867 (4th Cir. 1997); Hartman 
v. Bachert, 
880 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1995)).  The District Court also concluded that 
even if the 
"state-created danger" theory were applicable to Pahler's claims, 
defendants' alleged 
failure to use the ESU to conduct a raid on a suspected drug dealer's 
residence was not 
"'deliberatively indifferent' behavior that shocks the conscience 
constituting a substantive 
due process violation."  App. at 62.  Finally, the District Court 
determined that even if 
Pahler's "state-created danger" theory is found to apply to law 
enforcement officers who 
suffered employment-related injuries, McGroarty and Barrett are entitled 
to the defense of 
qualified immunity.  App. at 63. 
     The District Court also dismissed Pahler's Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due 
process "failure to train" claim.  The court held that Pahler "has neither 
identified the 
specific training the [C]ity should have offered which would have 
prevented his injury, 
nor has he established that such training was not provided."  App. at 65.  
In addition, the 
District Court noted that Pahler's complaint appears to support the view 
that the 
individual who engaged in the injurious act has been trained in the use of 
shotgun, but 
merely neglected to set the safety device.  According to the District 
Court, such conduct 
does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation.  App. at 65 
(citing County of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998) ("opining that 'liability 
for negligently 
inflicted harm is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional 
due process'")). 
                               II. 
     This court's review of a district court order dismissing a complaint 
pursuant to 
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted is plenary and 
we apply the same test as the District Court.  See Doug Grant, Inc. v. 
Greate Bay Casino 
Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183 (3d Cir. 2000).  Although our standard of review 
requires us to 
"accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint, we need not 
accept as true 
'unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences.'" Id. at 183-84 
(quoting City of 
Pittsburgh v. W. Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 263 n.13 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
                     A. State-Created Danger 
     Generally, the state has no affirmative obligation to protect its 
citizens from the 
violent acts of private individuals.  One of the exceptions to this 
general principle is the 
"state-created danger" theory of liability, which we adopted in Kneipp v. 
Tedder, 95 F.3d 
1199 (3d Cir. 1996).  We applied the four-part test articulated in Mark v. 
Borough of 
Hatboro, 51 F.3d 1137 (3d Cir. 1995), which holds a state actor liable if:  
                    (1) the harm ultimately caused was foreseeable and 
fairly 
          direct; (2) the state actor acted in willful disregard for the 
          safety of the plaintiff; (3) there existed some relationship 
          between the state and the plaintiff; (4) the state actors used 
          their authority to create an opportunity that otherwise would 
          not have existed for the third party's crime to occur. 
 Kneipp, 95 F.3d at 1208 (quoting Mark, 51 F.3d at 1152). 
     Thereafter, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998), 
the Supreme 
Court analyzed the overarching framework of substantive due process.  We 
held in Miller 
v. City of Philadelphia, 174 F.3d 368, 375 (3d Cir. 1999), that Lewis 
requires a court, in 
all substantive due process cases, to determine if the state actor's 
behavior shocks the 
conscience.  The precise degree of wrongfulness to reach the "conscience-
shocking" level 
depends upon the circumstances of a particular case. 
     In this case, the District Court held that the second factor of the 
Kneipp test has 
been modified by the "shock the conscience" standard, and what rises to 
that level will 
ultimately depend on the factual scenario of the case at hand.  We agree.  
Accordingly, a 
plaintiff seeking to recover under a "state-created danger" theory must 
show that the actor 
acted with a willful disregard for or deliberate indifference to 
plaintiff's safety that rises 
to the level of shocking the conscience. 
     The District Court stated that regardless of the degree of 
culpability that should be 
applied, the state-created danger theory arising out of the substantive 
due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the plaintiff while 
functioning as a police 
officer.  App. at 63.  The court also stated that "[e]ven if the state 
created danger theory 
could be applied to police officers, the conduct of the defendants would 
not support a 
finding that shocks the conscience."  App. at 63.  Because we agree with 
the latter, we 
need not decide whether the "state-created danger" theory applies to a 
police officer.  
Failure to utilize the ESU to raid a suspected drug-dealer's residence can 
hardly be 
described as "deliberately indifferent" behavior that shocks the 
conscience constituting a 
substantive due process violation.  As the Supreme Court has stated, 
"[t]he Due Process 
Clause 'is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised personnel 
decisions.'"  Collins 
v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 129 (1992) (quoting Bishop v. 
Wood, 426 U.S. 
341, 350 (1976)). 
     Pahler argues that the District Court acted inappropriately in 
deciding that the 
defendants' actions did not constitute deliberately indifferent behavior 
that shocks the 
conscience because of the lack of an established record.  He hypothesizes 
that discovery 
could reveal that the defendants deliberately chose not to utilize the ESU 
because they did 
not want to allocate the additional funds necessary to deploy the ESU.  In 
Collins, the 
Supreme Court cautioned: 
                    Decisions concerning the allocation of resources to 
individual 
          programs, . . . and to particular aspects of those programs, 
          such as the training . . . of employees, involve a host of 
policy 
          choices that must be made by locally elected representatives, 
          rather than by federal judges interpreting the basic charter of 
          Government for the entire country. 
 
503 U.S. at 128-29.  Moreover, we note that Pahler's injury was not caused 
by the 
dangers of the drug raid but by the negligence of a fellow police officer.  
Accepting all of 
the allegations of the complaint, we agree with the District Court that 
nothing suggests 
that defendants acted with indifference that shocks the conscience.  
Accordingly, 
Pahler's substantive due process claim under the "state-created danger" 
theory must fail.   
                       B. Failure to Train 
     Pahler's second claim is based on the defendants' alleged failure to 
train.  A 
municipality may be held constitutionally liable under  1983 for failing 
to properly train 
its officers.  See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387 (1989); 
Reitz v. County of 
Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 145 (3d Cir. 1997).  However, inadequate police 
training may serve 
as the basis for  1983 liability only where the failure to train "amounts 
to deliberate 
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into 
contact."  City of 
Canton, 489 U.S. at 388.  Additionally, "adequately trained officers 
occasionally make 
mistakes; the fact that they do says little about the training program or 
the legal basis for 
holding the city liable."  Id. at 391. 
     "[S]tringent standards of culpability and causation must be applied" 
when an 
injury is caused by an employee rather than the municipality.  Reitz, 125 
F.3d at 145.  
Thus, "[a] plaintiff pressing a  1983 claim must identify a failure to 
provide specific 
training that has a causal nexus with their injuries and must demonstrate 
that the absence 
of that specific training can reasonably be said to reflect a deliberate 
indifference to 
whether the alleged constitutional deprivations occurred."  Id. 
     Pahler has not pled any of the necessary elements to state a claim 
upon which 
liability may be imposed against the defendants under the failure to train 
theory.  In fact, 
Pahler stated in his complaint that the officer who engaged in the 
injurious act merely 
neglected to set the safety device.  Simply put, Pahler makes no 
allegation that establishes 
his injuries were cased by the defendants' deliberately indifferent 
failure to train the 
City's officers.  As unfortunate as the mistake was, such a mistake cannot 
form the basis 
of  1983 claim for "failure to train." 
                               III. 
     Because we find that District Court did not err in dismissing 
Pahler's  1983 
claim, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
__________________________ 
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 
          Please file the foregoing opinion. 
 
 
                                   /s/   Dolores K. Sloviter           
                              Circuit Judge
 
